- Analyze Brutus's central thesis regarding the incompatibility of an extended territory with a free republican government.
- Examine the influence of Enlightenment political philosophy, particularly the theories of Baron de Montesquieu, on Anti-Federalist thought.
- Evaluate Brutus's specific warnings concerning legislative representation, diverse regional interests, standing armies, and executive power.
- Contrast the Anti-Federalist fear of consolidated national power with the structural remedies later proposed by the Federalists.
Published in October 1787 under the pseudonym "Brutus" (widely attributed to New York jurist and statesman Robert Yates), Brutus No. 1 is the quintessential Anti-Federalist critique of the newly proposed United States Constitution. Brutus challenges the foundational premise that a diverse, continental-scale nation can successfully maintain liberty under a single consolidated republic. He argues that republics must remain small and homogeneous to preserve civic virtue, popular consent, and effective self-governance; otherwise, distant rulers inevitably degenerate into tyranny, overriding local laws and standing above public accountability.
Part 1: The Central Question of Continental Consolidation
In the opening passages, Brutus frames the fundamental constitutional debate of 1787: whether the thirteen independent states should be welded into a single sovereign empire or retain their distinct republican character. He establishes the baseline agreement that any adopted government must be free, secure citizens' liberty, and provide a fair and equal representation of the people.
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the the people. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
Part 2: Lessons from History and Political Philosophy: Montesquieu on Size
Brutus summons classical political theory and Enlightenment philosophy—most notably the French philosopher Montesquieu—to argue that republics are inherently fragile when stretched across vast geographical boundaries. In large states, personal ambition overrides public good, and political power becomes concentrated beyond the watchful eye of the citizenry.
Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the baron de Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Chap. xvi. Vol. I [Book VIII]. "It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected." Of the same opinion is the marquis Beccarari.
History furnishes no example of a free republic, anything like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.
Part 3: The Nature of Representation and Democratic Impossibility
Turning from philosophy to practical mechanics, Brutus examines the nature of sovereignty. In a pure democracy, citizens assemble directly; in a republic, they govern through chosen representatives. However, across a continent of millions of souls, a legislature small enough to act efficiently cannot possibly know or reflect the sentiments of the people, while a legislature large enough to represent everyone becomes unwieldy and chaotic.
Not only the opinions of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion concerning it.
In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind.
In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed. This is the true criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the whole... the latter by the will of one, or a few... Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government.
The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business? It certainly is not.
Part 4: Diversity of Climate, Interest, and Custom
Brutus highlights the immense cultural, economic, and geographic diversity among the thirteen states. Because their climates, productions, habits, and legal customs vary radically, a single centralized legislature will be composed of discordant factions perpetually at war with one another, paralyzing effective governance.
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving, against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government.
The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other.
- 1Identify the Anti-Factions Premise: Brutus argues that diversity of interest prevents consensus and causes legislative gridlock.
- 2Examine Federalist No. 10 Counter-Argument: James Madison later argued that extended diversity actually *protects* liberty by multiplying factions so that no single majority can oppress the minority.
- 3Evaluate Institutional Outcomes: Determine how constitutional structures (bicameralism, federalism, separation of powers) attempt to manage regional and economic diversity.
Part 5: Standing Armies vs. Public Confidence in Law Enforcement
A cornerstone of Brutus's argument is that free republics enforce laws through civic affection and public confidence, never through military force. In an extensive empire where citizens do not know their rulers, government can only enforce compliance at "the point of the bayonet"—transforming the republic into a dreaded military despotism.
The laws cannot be executed in a republic, of an extent equal to that of the United States, with promptitude. The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of the laws, either by an armed force, maintained at the public expense for that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his command, in case of resistance.
In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, standing armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince... But they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and [are] abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic...
A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must depend upon the support of its citizens... But the people will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United States... The people in Georgia and New-Hampshire would not know one another's mind... The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views... and will not support the laws they pass. Hence the government will be nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet--a government of all others the most to be dreaded.
Part 6: Legislative Blind Spots and Executive Aggrandizement
Brutus warns that a distant national legislature can never attend to local wants across a vast continent. Furthermore, the sweeping executive powers entrusted to the federal government—commanding armed forces, pardoning offenses, collecting revenues, and distributing offices—will inevitably corrupt national leaders, placing them beyond popular control.
In a republic of such vast extent as the United-States, the legislature cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this nature, that would be continually arising.
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United-States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expending them... must be lodged and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few.
When these are attended with great honor and emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interest men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.
Part 7: Conclusion and Warning Against Ratification
Brutus delivers his final verdict: because the proposed Constitution fundamentally threatens to consolidate thirteen distinct republics into one dangerous imperial state, it must be decisively rejected.
These are some of the reasons by which it appears that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.